Sunday 20 May 2012

Spot the differences

Holism is the thesis that any given reason for action may be a reason for a different action in different circumstances. This can include being a reason for an action which is completely the reverse. Jonathan Dancy has argued that holism may be sufficient for Particularism, the thesis that moral principles do not exist, or can change or reverse depending upon circumstances. According to Brad Hookers arguments, Moral Particularism might actually be a long way from holism.

I want to know, what is the difference between reasons and moral principles?

One difference is that a moral principal is a reason to act, but a reason is not a moral principle. The category of principals contains the category of moral principles, an example of which might be "do not lie". The border category might include non-moral principles, like "if in doubt, turn left" as a principal for finding ones way in a maze. The "if in doubt turn left" principal only has a narrow area of usefulness.

Moral principles, like other sorts of principal, have a limited area of use. For a start moral principles are of use only when our actions effect another. At least I think that must be the case. What counter examples could there be to this? It seems that there may be some moral obligations one has to ones self, so it is perhaps best to include the principles which govern all agent regarding actions. Through notions like property, this can be extended further to the inanimate or to the non-agents. There is probably a lot more to say here about our moral responsibilities towards eco-systems and natural systems, I will note this, and leave it to one side just now.

What are reasons? I have a reason to do an action if I have a belief. There is a reason for a bridge collapsing which is not the same thing. In one case a reason is agent centred, something I may possess. In the other case the reason is prior to the event and causes it directly.

If reason is possessed by an agent as a belief, then it is not dissimilar from a principle. My principles are certainly something I might believe in, and act upon. So how does it all stack up?

If Principles are a subset of a subset of things that might be reasons, then it does seem that Hooker was correct about holism needing an argument to connect to Dancy's particularism.

Back to the books!

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